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ADmINIsTRATIvE LAw-SUBSTITUTION OF DEFENDANT'S SUCCESSORS IN OFFICE INEQUITABLE TAX PROCEEDINO.-The plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the •
County Treasurer, County Assessor, County Attorney, and the members of theBoard of Supervisors and their successors in office, as taxing authorities of the
county, from further wrongfully assessing certain lands or bringing suit to
collect taxes already assessed. The bill was dismissed, but before an appeal
was taken the officers had retired from office. The' appellant asked that the
successors in office be substituted as appellees in the case. Held, that the succeed-
ing Treasurer, Assessor, and Attorney could not be substituted, but that the
succeeding members of the Board of Supervisors, a continuing body, could be
substituted. Irvin v. Webb (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 293.
A suit to enjoin a public officer from enforcing a statute is personal and, in
the absence of a statutory provision for continuing it against his successor, abates
upon his death or retirement from office. Pullman Co. v. Croom (1913) 231
U. S. 571, 34 Sup. Ct. 182. By Act of Congress, successors of United States
officers who have been sued may be substituted. Act of Feb. 8, 1899 (30 Stat.
at L. 822). But no authority exists for the substitution of successorg of state
officers in such cases. It should be provided for by statute. For a discussion
of the right to recover from a commissioner taxes wrongly collected by his
predecessor, see COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 537.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL TAXING POWER-REGULATION OF CHILD LABOR
BY TAXATION.-The plaintiff permitted a boy under fourteen years of age to work
in his factory, thus incurring the tax of ten per cent on the net profits of the
year as provided by statute. "An Act to provide revenue and for other purposes."
Act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. at L. 1057) ch. 18, secs. 1200-1207. Havingpaid the tax under protest, the plaintiff sued for its recovery on the ground that
the statute was a regulation of employment of child labor in the states and conse-quently repugnant to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. Held, (Clark, J.,
dissenting) that the statute was unconstitutional. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.(May 15, 1922) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct Term, 1921, No. 657.
The court says in effect that the act is on its face a regulation of an exclusively
state function, and cannot be sustained by being called a tax. "To give such magic
to the word 'tax' would be to break down all constitutional limitations of thepowers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States." The
oleomargarine case and' similar authorities, which were supposed to forecast the
opposite conclusion, are differentiated, not expressly overruled. For discussions of
the instant case in the lower court, see COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE.LAw JOURNAL,
310; NOTES (922) 35 HARv. L. RIEv. 859.
DAMAGES-CONDITIONAL SALE-FuLL PRICE COLLECTIBLE AS LIQUIDATED DAM-
AGES'.-The defendant sold an automobile truck to the plaintiff on condition thatin case of default in payments by the vendee, the vendor could recover possession
of the truck and collect all sums remaining unpaid as liquidated damages. The
vendee defaulted and returned the truck. He then brought a bill to prevent the
enforcement of a mortgage given as security for payment of the balance. Held,
that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought. Bedard v. Ransom (1922,
Mass.) 134 N. E. 392.
The use of the term "liquidated damages" or "penalty" in a contract is not
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conclusive. Dyer Bros. v. Central Iron Works (192o) 182 Calif. 588, 189 Pac.
444. If the amount is fixed with the intent of preventing a breach, it is construed
to be a penalty. Dubinsky *v. Wells Bros. (1914) 218 Mass. 232, 105 N. E. lOO4;
Seeman v. Bieman, (i9oo) io8 Wis. 365, 84 N. W. 490. Where the object is to
estimate the probable damage, it is generally held to be liquiidated damages.
Florence Wagon Works v. Salmon (igio) 8 Ga. App. 197, 68 S. E. 866; Davidow
v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. (192o) 211 Mich. 90, 178 N. W. 776; (igio) 20 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 153. If the sum agreed upon is not unreasonable, payment will
be enforced irrespective of whether it is called a "penalty" or "liquidated dam-
ages." In re Liberty Doll Co. (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 242 Fed. 695; Wise v. United
States (1919) 249 U. S. 361, 39 Sup. Ct. 303. In view of the almost universal
practice of refusing to accept the terms selected by the parties as conclusive when
injustice will ensue, the result reached by the instant case seems remarkable.
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY-RES GESTAE-SPNTANEOUS UTrERANCEs.-The deceased
was shot by an unknown person and was rendered speechless. Thirty minutes
later, upon regaining his power of speech, he stated that a stranger had shot
him. In the trial of the defendant for murder, this utterance was admitted.
Held, that the evidence was properly admitted, since the deceased had had no
opportunity to deliberate. Commonwealth v. Puntario (1922, Pa.) 115 Atl. 831.
The defendant was indicted for murder. The trial court excluded a self-
serving statement made by him to a sheriff who arrived a few minutes after the
shooting. Held, that a sufficient time had elapsed after the main event to render
the statement inadmissible as part of the res gestae. Sherman v. State (1921,
Okla.) 2o2 Pac. 521.
In several jurisdictions the utterance and the event must be absolutely con-
temporaneous to make the statement admissible. Eastman v. Boston & Me. Ry.
(1896) 165 Mass. 342, 43 N. E. 115; McCarrick v. Kealy (1898) 70 Conn. 642, 40
Atl. 6o3. The instant cases apply the theory, advocated by Dean Wigmore and
adopted by most states, that the utterance need not be contemporaneous to con-
stitute a part of the same event, but must be made under the stress of some
startling occurrence, and within a period of time so closely connected with it,
that the mind of the declarant is still under the control of the excitement and
incapable of fabrication. Eby v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (1917) 258 Pa. 525,
lO2 Atl. 209; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. 1747; (1919) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 814. The admissibility of such evidence is within the reasonable dis-
cretion of the court. Roach v. Great Northern Ry. (1916) 133 Minn. 257, 158
N. W. 232. The mental condition of the declarant should properly be the con-
trolling factor in such determination, since it is a better guaranty of trustworthi-
ness than mere lapse of time. See Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utter-
ances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 229; see also
(1914) 23 ibid. 282.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT BY LESSEE TO PAY TAXEs-TAxES PAYABLE
AFTER ExPIRATiON OF TERm.-The lessee covenanted to pay all taxes assessed,
levied, or imposed upon the premises during the term. The lessor sued to recover
for taxes which were assessed during the last year of the term, but not payable
until after it had expired. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could
recover. Wall v. Hess (1922) 232 N. Y. 472, 134 N. E. 536.
It is generally held that the lessee by assuming to pay taxes assessed "during
the term" is under a duty to pay them, even though by law they are not due until
after the expiration of the lease. Baker v. Horan (1917) 227 Mass. 415, 116 N. E.
8o8; Ogden v. Getty (9o5) Ioo App. Div. 430, 91 N. Y. Supp. 664; Elliot v.
Gantt (1895) 64 Mo. App. 248; see Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) sec. 143.
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The minority view in the instant case was that the parties intended that the
lessee should be liable only for taxes which became a lien on the land before the
lessee gave up the premises.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT-IN.yRy TO Tiran PARTY.-The defendants had been engaged by a vendor to weigh a quantity of beans which
they knew the plaintiff had bought and had contracted to pay for according to
the defendants' certificate of weight. The defendants negligently certified the
weight to be more than it actually was, and the plaintiff, in consequence, overpaid
the vendor. The plaintiff then brought an action of tort for negligence. Held,(one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff could recover. glanzer v. Shepard
(1922, N. Y. Ct. of App.) 67 N. Y.L. Joua. 23 (April.7, 1922).
The court frankly disregarded the obstacle of contractual privity and imposed
a duty of care on the defendants merely because they knew that a third party
would rely on their act. Liability for injury to a third party caused by the negli-gent performance of a contract duty has been extended by means of numerous
and increasing exceptions until the old rule denying such liability has been prac-
tically obliterated. See Collette zr. Page (1921, P. I.) 114 Atl. 136; (1921) 31
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 109; (1922) 20 Mi Cr. L. Rxv. 561. Those engaged in
supplying information are traditionally immune from liability to those not inprivity of contract. Jaillet v. Cashman (1921, Sup. Ct.) 115 Misc. 383, 189 N. Y.Supp. 743; (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 218. The decision of the Appellate
Division in the instant case was approved, and the subject generally discussed in
COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 607.
WORK 'S"S COMPENSATION-INJURY CAUSED BY ATTACK OF EpIEpsy NqOT
ARISING "OUT OF EMPLOYENT."--The plaintiff, while operating an elevator in thedefendant's building, was attacked by a fit of epilepsy producing unconsciousness.
He was later found in an injured condition at the bottom of the elevator shaft.
On inspection the elevator equipment was found to be in perfect working order.Held, (two judges dissenting) that the plaintiff's injuries did not arise out of the
employment Kelly v. Nichols (1921) 199 App. Div. 870, 191 N. Y. Supp. 445.
Although the courts have always attempted to interpret workmen's compensa-
tion acts liberally in favor of the employee, they have almost uniformly refused
to construe an injury caused solely by disease as arising "out of the employment."
Joseph v. United Kimnona Co. (1921) 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N. Y. Supp. 7oo;Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co. (1921) lo8 Kan. 320, 195 Pac. 863; Brooker v.Industrial Acc. Com. (1921, Calif.) 2oo Pac. 17; contra, Vulcan Detinning Co. V.
Industrial Com. (1920) 295 Ill. 141, 128 N. E. 917. This view is clearly correct.
Otherwise any injury arising in the course of employment would be compensative
and the requirement that it also arise "out of" the employment would be rendered
nugatory. See Scholtzhauer zt. C. & L. Lunch Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 12, 134 N. E.
701; COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 768.
